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Fred Oeissner, member of the SED Politbureau, chief theoretician of the Party, and reputedly close to SED Secretary General Walter Ulbricht, in a lecture before the assembled student body of the Karl Marx Academy presented on 9 August 1950 the following views on current issues linked with the peace campaign, the National Front, and the October elections:

1. SED members within the peace committees will strive to broaden the organizational base of the movement and in their ideological fight present the true identity of aggressors, combat pacifism, neutrality (Professor Noack) and all ideological forms in which preparations for war are disguised, among which anti-Bolshevism is especially dangerous.
2. "Since we are not clairvoyant and unable to tell whether we will be able to prevent a war which would entail our fighting side by side with the Soviets, it is necessary to enlighten the population (through the peace committees) on their tasks in the event peace should not be preserved." In fighting pacifism, which, however, should not be the main line of attack, one should argue that pacifism harms the peace movement by rendering it defenseless. Force of arms has to be countered with force of arms based on the military might of the peace-loving nations.
3. National Front propaganda has to use as its point of departure the Potsdam agreement which was consonant with Communist aims and therefore especially welcome. National resistance only began with the attempts of American imperialism at splitting Germany. Nobody was thinking of national resistance before that time.
4. The criticism which the SED has aimed at the KPD in Western Germany in effect states that the KPD has failed to appreciate the importance beyond the DDR of Stalin's telegram. That telegram refers to the whole of Germany. By the same token the KPD has failed to understand that the DDR serves as the keystone for the whole of Germany. Even the SED in the exercise of self-criticism had to confess that it failed to comprehend the Stalin telegram in its full import. This has been reflected in an inadequate orientation toward questions affecting the whole of Germany. The SED has been too preoccupied with the DDR at the expense of accepting responsibility

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for all of Germany.

5. Whereas the KPD will now have to concentrate on National Resistance, the SED should concentrate on the whole of Germany. Adenauer and the people back of him have reacted much faster to the resolutions of the Third Party Conference than our own press. That, too, proves the importance of the Party Conference. The situation in Western Germany is far from hopeless. One ought not to judge it on the basis of election results and what the press has to say. One could more profitably watch the growing mass organizations. The situation in Western Germany could be compared to that in Russia prior to 1917. The KPD has failed to exploit a situation which, objectively speaking, looks favorable. A mistake made in Western Germany has been, for example, the execution of our fight against agents under the glare of press publicity rather than making it an internal affair of the Party. This has not exactly helped to increase the popularity of the KPD in Western Germany. Another shortcoming is the inability of the old comrades in the KPD to adapt themselves to changed conditions. We shall have to lean more heavily on the youth and on the FDJ.
6. If we succeed in fomenting burning hatred against the occupying powers, the Americans may decide to depart after all. A comparison between Southern Korea and Western Germany has to allow for the important difference that the whole of Southern Korea is opposed to the Americans, while this cannot be said of the West German and Berlin population. If, however, we succeed in forming a broad resistance front, it is quite possible that we may succeed in getting rid of the Americans.
7. As regards our cultural work, the main prerequisite for improvement is a re-shuffling of persons in key positions. Furthermore, careful scrutiny of the cultural sections of the Party and of the leading functionaries of the cultural mass organizations is necessary. All unrealistic idealists will have to be removed.
8. In promoting party education, the theoretical importance of Stalin and his writings will have to be stressed increasingly. The Karl Marx Academy must increase its vigilance. More study should be given to the past history of the Party. One of the tasks of the Academy will be editing the biography of Ernst Thaelmann, which, at the same time, will serve as the history of the workers' movement in the Weimar Republic.
9. All tasks set by the Party Conference will have to culminate in the battle the SED will be called upon to fight on October 15th. The SED deprecates the voicing of opinions within the Party claiming that the forthcoming elections are not truly democratic (this argument rests on an inability to differentiate between democracy and parliamentarism). Dangerous also is the widespread belief that all the excitement is quite superfluous, because nothing untoward is liable to happen. It cannot be immaterial to us how many valid and how many invalid votes are passed (there will not be "No" votes).

**Comment:** The impression among the students, after listening to Oelssner's address, was the belief in a steadily increasing danger of war. A representative cross-section believes that an outbreak of hostilities even before the end of the current term (December 1950) cannot be ruled out. The supervening disclosure of the Noel Field conspiracy temporarily resulted in excited talk about the general unreliability of Party functionaries. Some students claimed that in an emergency 80% of the students of the Karl Marx Academy would presumably take to flight. The hostile reaction of the local population in Klein-Machnow (a notoriously reactionary residential district outside the city limits of Gross-Berlin) to the soliciting of signatures for the Stockholm atom bomb declaration has generated among the student body considerable concern which the publication of allegedly authentic photographs from Korea purporting to show the treatment meted out to Communist partisans by the Americans has not helped to alleviate.)

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